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ATOMIC POLYMORPHISM
FERNANDO FERREIRA AND GILDA FERREIRA
Abstract. It has been known for six years that the restriction of Girard’s polymorphic system F to
atomic universal instantiations interprets the full fragment of the intuitionistic propositional calculus.
We firstly observe that Tait’s method of “convertibility” applies quite naturally to the proof of strong
normalization of the restricted Girard system. We then show that each β-reduction step of the full
intuitionistic propositional calculus translates into one or more βη-reduction steps in the restricted Girard
system. As a consequence, we obtain a novel and perspicuous proof of the strong normalization property
for the full intuitionistic propositional calculus. It is noticed that this novel proof bestows a crucial role
to η-conversions.
§1. Introduction. In the early seventies, Jean-Yves Girard [5] and John Rey-
nolds [13] introduced, independently, quantification over types in the λ-calculus
and defined an attendant lambda system F (a.k.a. λ2). The primitive version of
this system is very elegant, with only two generators of types (formulas): im-
plication and second-order universal quantification. Apart from the absence of
first-order quantification (whose inclusion poses no particular problems, being
essentially a matter of bearing with extra notation), the restriction to implication
and second-order universal quantification does not limit the apparatus of logic.
As it is well-known, Dag Prawitz [12] showed how to introduce the remaining
logical connectives of falsum, conjunction and disjunction in second-order logic,
thereby interpreting the full intuitionistic propositional calculus. System F enjoys
both the strong normalization and the Church-Rosser properties. The proof of the
first of these properties is a somewhat delicate affair because second-order quan-
tifications may instantiate arbitrary types (formulas). Due to this impredicative
feature of F, Girard’s normalization proof relies on strong forms of second-order
comprehension via the ability to form sets of terms known as reducibility candi-
dates.
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We study the restriction of system F according to which the range of the type
variables is constituted by the atomic types only. This system was introduced in
[3] under the name of atomic PSOLi, where it was used as the basis for a com-
mentary on the non-realistic cast of the philosophical position of predicativism.
In that very paper it was observed that, even though only atomic instantiations are
allowed, the restricted system – which we now denote by Fat or λ2 at – is still able
to introduce the remaining logical connectives of falsum, conjunction and dis-
junction (via the very same definitions of Prawitz but, in our restricted case, also
relying crucially on the so-called phenomenon of instantiation overflow, briefly
recalled at the start of Section 4). The embedding of the full propositional calculus
into Fat was independently rediscovered by Tor Sandqvist [15].
In this paper, we give a proof of the strong normalization of Fat with respect to
βη-conversions and observe that the predicativity requirement of Fat greatly sim-
plifies the normalization argument. As an application, we present a new manner
of proving strong normalization for the full intuitionistic propositional calculus
with the standard β-conversions (using its embedding into Fat). Of course, the
latter normalization result is known for a long time (see, for instance, [11]). How-
ever, the argument given in this paper seems to us specially perspicuous since it
follows from a more general and natural result, viz. the above mentioned strong
normalization of Fat, and relies on some algorithms that may be of independent
interest and worth analyzing in detail.
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we define and describe
system Fat. The restriction on the range of the type variables makes it easy to
adapt Tait’s technique of reducibility (“convertibility,” in Tait’s original terminol-
ogy [16]) in order to show that the system Fat enjoys the property of strong nor-
malization for βη-conversions. This is the subject of Section 3. Section 4 starts by
briefly describing the embedding of the full intuitionistic propositional calculus
into the system Fat. The next order of business is to show that a β-conversion in
the full language of the propositional intuitionistic calculus translates (via the em-
bedding) into one or more βη-conversions in Fat. Therefore, we are able to give a
new proof of the strong normalization of the full intuitionistic propositional cal-
culus. We finish the paper with some remarks.
§2. The Fat calculus: a predicative variant of system F. We present Fat in
the (operational) λ-calculus style. Later on, we also use a formulation in the nat-
ural deduction calculus. This dichotomy between the operational and deductive
sides of the calculus (known as the Curry-Howard correspondence) is prevalent in
the paper.
Definition 1. Types are constructed from atomic types (propositional constants
P, Q, R, . . . and type variables X, Y, Z, . . . ) by means of two type-forming oper-
ations,→ and ∀, in the following way:
(i) Atomic types are types.
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(ii) If A and B are types then A→ B is a type.
(iii) If A is a type and X is a type variable then ∀X.A is a type.
By regarding types as formulas, we have the usual definitions of free and bound
(type) variables in a type. As usual, we can freely rename the bound variables in
a type. We denote the set of free variables in A by FV(A). Given a type A, a type
variable X and an atomic type C, we write A[C/X] for the type obtained from A
by substituting the free occurrences of X in A by C (without loss of generality, if
C is itself a variable, we may assume that it is free for X in A).
Definition 2. Terms are generated by the following clauses:
(i) For each type A there are countably infinite many assumption variables of
type A, xA, yA, zA, etc. Assumption variables are terms.
(ii) If tA→B and qA are terms of types A→ B and A, respectively, then (tA→BqA)B
is a term of type B.
(iii) If tB is a term of type B and xA is an assumption variable of type A, then
(λxA.tB)A→B is a term of type A→ B. A term of this form is called an arrow
abstraction.
(iv) If t∀X.A is a term of type ∀X.A and C in an atomic type, then (t∀X.AC)A[C/X] is
a term of type A[C/X].
(v) If tA is a term of type A and the type variable X is not free in the type of any
free assumption variable of tA, then (ΛX.tA)∀X.A is a term of type ∀X.A. A
term of this form is called a universal abstraction.
When it is clear from the context, we sometimes omit the (type) superscript
in tA, denoting the term simply by t. The difference between Girard’s system F
and the restriction Fat lies in the fourth clause above: F allows the construction
of terms of the form (tD)A[D/X], with D any type whatsoever; Fat only permits
second-order application to atomic types. This difference explains the impredica-
tivity of system F (e.g., D can be ∀X.A itself), against the predicativity of Fat.
Note, also, that in Girard’s system there is no sensible notion of subformula be-
cause universal types ∀X.A allow instantiations A[D/X] for any type D, however
complex. In contrast, there is a natural definition of subformula within the types
of Fat: we say that the immediate subformulas of ∀X.A are the formulas of the
form A[C/X], where C is an atomic type (free for X in A). The notion of sub-
formula provides attendant notions of definition and proof by the complexity of
formulas. This feature will play a crucial role in the normalization proof below.
Definition 3. The set of free variables in a term t, denoted by FV(t), is defined
inductively by:
FV(xA) :≡ {xA} ∪ FV(A)
FV(tq) :≡ FV(t) ∪ FV(q)
FV(λxA.t) :≡ (FV(t) \ {xA}) ∪ FV(A)
FV(tC) :≡ FV(t) ∪ FV(C)
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FV(ΛX.t) :≡ FV(t) \ {X}
Type and assumption variables not free in t are called bound variables in t.
When necessary, we may assume that the sets of free and bound variables in a
term are disjoint (all expressions are considered modulo a renaming of the bound
variables). The substitution of a free assumption variable xA in a term t by a term
sA is done in the expected way (see [17]) and denoted by t[s/x].
Definition 4. Given a term t of type A and C an atomic type, we define a new





(ΛY.q)[C/X] :≡ ΛY.(q[C/X]), for Y , X, w.l.o.g. C , Y
(qD)[C/X] :≡ q[C/X]D[C/X], with D an atomic type.
Again we assume that there is no clash of variables, i.e., in case C is a type
variable, we assume that it is free for X in q, r and A. It can easily be shown,
by induction on the complexity of the term t, that t[C/X] above is well-defined.
Free type variables can be regarded as parameters, in the sense that we can sub-
stitute them by propositional constants. After such a substitution, a term does not
have free type variables. Now, consider a free assumption variable xA in such a
term (after the substitution is effected). Does it have a determinate type? In other
words, is A a sentence? The answer is yes, and this is due to the important restric-
tion (v) of Definition 2. This means that the type of a free assumption variable in
a term t depends only on the free type variables of t.
We need also the concept of simultaneous substitution. We skip its definition
and use for this kind of substitution the following notations: t[s1/x1, . . . , sn/xn]
and t[C1/X1, . . . ,Cn/Xn].
In analogy with the system F, we have two β-conversions: one for implication,
the arrow β-conversion, and the other for second-order universal quantification,
the universal β-conversion. They are, respectively,
(λx.t)s  t[s/x]
(ΛX.t)C  t[C/X],
where the left hand side of a conversion is called its redex and the right hand
side its contractum. It is clear that the previous conversions are well defined,
originating contractums in Fat of the same type of the redexes. We also need in
the sequel the so-called η-conversions:
λx.(tx)  t, with x < FV(t)
ΛX.(tX)  t, with X < FV(t).
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The first one is the arrow η-conversion, the second is the universal η-conversion.
Again they are well defined in Fat and terms on the left hand side are called
redexes and on the right hand side are called contractums.
Definition 5. A term t reduces to a term q (and we write t ≽ q) if there is a
sequence of βη-conversions from t to q, i.e., a sequence t ≡ u0, u1, . . . , un ≡ q,
such that for i = 0, 1, . . . , n − 1, ui+1 is obtained from ui by replacing a redex by
its contractum. A term is normal if it has no redexes and so we can not apply
any conversion any longer. A term t is strongly normalizable if all the reduction
sequences starting with t have finite length.
When a term t reduces to a term q in one step, we write t ≻1 q. If t is strongly
normalizable, we denote by µ(t) a number that bounds the length of every reduc-
tion sequence beginning with t. Such bound exists because the reduction tree of a
term is finitely branching and, hence, we can apply König’s lemma.
By the Curry-Howard correspondence, we can present the system Fat as a nat-
ural deduction calculus. The formulas of Fat are the types: formulas generated
by only two primitive logic connectives, viz the implication and the second-order
universal quantifier. Natural deductions in intuitionistic logic correspond to terms
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with C an atomic formula, free for X in A. Again, it is the restriction on C that
distinguishes Fat from F.
In the natural deduction formulation, the arrow β-conversions and the universal
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where C is an atomic formula, free for X in A. The arrow η-conversions and the























§3. The strong normalization proof of Fat. In this section, we adapt/extend
Tait’s method in order to show that Fat is strongly normalizable.
Definition 6. We say that the term tA is reducible if t ∈ RedA, with RedA de-
fined by induction on the complexity of the type (formula) A as follows:
For C an atomic type, t ∈ RedC :≡ t is strongly normalizable.
t ∈ RedA→B :≡ for all q, if q ∈ RedA then tq ∈ RedB.
t ∈ Red∀X.A :≡ for all atomic types C, tC ∈ RedA[C/X].
Notice that in system F it wouldn’t make sense to define a third clause as fol-
lows: t ∈ Red∀X.A :≡ for all types C, tC ∈ RedA[C/X]. In effect, the type A[C/X]
could be of arbitrary high complexity, and the definition by induction would fail.
Let us call neutral terms the terms of the form x, tq or tC (i.e., terms which are
not abstractions).
Lemma 1. RedA satisfies the following three conditions:
(CR 1) If t ∈ RedA then t is strongly normalizable.
(CR 2) If t ∈ RedA and t ≽ t′ then t′ ∈ RedA.
(CR 3) If t is neutral and t′ ∈ RedA for all t′ such that t ≻1 t′, then t ∈ RedA.
As a special case of CR 3, we have in particular:
(CR 4) If tA is neutral and normal then t ∈ RedA.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the complexity of the type (formula) A.
For the atomic and arrow types, the proof follows exactly as in [6], Section 6.2.
We just have to analyze the type A :≡ ∀X.B.
Take t ∈ Red∀X.B in order to prove that t is strongly normalizable. By definition
of Red∀X.B, tX ∈ RedB. By induction hypothesis, RedB satisfies CR 1, so tX
is strongly normalizable. Clearly, each reduction sequence for t gives rise to a
reduction sequence for tX by applying each term of the sequence to X. Hence, t
is strongly normalizable.
In order to prove CR 2, let t ∈ Red∀X.B and t ≽ t′. We want to show that
t′ ∈ Red∀X.B. Let C be an atomic type. We know that tC ∈ RedB[C/X]. Since
tC ≽ t′C, by induction hypothesis (CR 2, for RedB[C/X]), we have t′C ∈ RedB[C/X].
ATOMIC POLYMORPHISM 7
For condition CR 3, take t∀X.B as in the hypothesis. We want to prove that t ∈
Red∀X.B. Let C be an atomic type. Note that tC is neutral and that the redexes in
tC occur in t (since t is neutral and, hence, not a universal abstraction). Therefore,
any single reduction step from tC has the form t′C with t ≻1 t′. By hypothesis
t′ ∈ Red∀X.B, and we get t′C ∈ RedB[C/X]. Applying now the induction hypothesis
(CR 3 for RedB[C/X]), we conclude that tC ∈ RedB[C/X]. ⊣
Lemma 2. If for all reducible q of type A, t[q/xA] is reducible, then so is λx.t.
Proof. By definition, we need to show that, for every reducible u (of type A),
(λx.t)u is reducible. The proof is by induction on µ(t) + µ(u). By CR 3, we prove
that every one step reduction from (λx.t)u is reducible. The possible one step
reducts are the following: t[u/x], (λx.t′)u, (λx.t)u′ and su, where in the second
case t ≻1 t′, in the third case u ≻1 u′ and in the last case t is sx (for t′, u′ and
s appropriate terms, the latter one without free occurrences of x). The first three
cases were studied in [6], Subsection 6.3.2. The last case reduces to the first since
su ≡ (sx)[u/x] ≡ t[u/x]. ⊣
We need to have an analogous result for universal abstraction.
Lemma 3. If for all atomic types C, t[C/X] is reducible and X is not free in the
type of a free assumption variable of t, then ΛX.t is reducible.
Proof. We prove that, for all terms t satisfying the conditions of the lemma, we
have: For all atomic types C, (ΛX.t)C is reducible. The proof is by induction on
µ(t). (Indeed, t is strongly normalizable because t is t[X/X] which, by supposition,
is reducible and hence, by CR 1 is strongly normalizable.)
Fix C an atomic type. Since the term (ΛX.t)C is neutral, we only have to
show that the one-step reducts from this term are reducible (thanks to CR 3).
Such a one step reduct must be of the form t[C/X], (ΛX.t′)C with t ≻1 t′ or
sC, when t is sX and X does not occur free in s. In the first case, reducibility
follows from the hypothesis. In the second case, note that µ(t′) < µ(t) and that,
for all atomic types D, t′[D/X] is reducible (the last assertion uses CR 2). So,
by induction hypothesis, (ΛX.t′)C is reducible. The third case reduces to the first
since sC ≡ (sX)[C/X] ≡ t[C/X]. ⊣
Proposition 1. Let t be any term (not assumed to be reducible) and suppose that
all the free assumption variables of t are among x1, . . . , xn, of types A1, . . . , An
(respectively). Suppose, in addition, that all the free type variables of t are
among X1, . . . , Xm. If C1, . . . ,Cm are atomic types and q1, . . . , qn are reducible
terms of types A1[C1/X1, . . . ,Cm/Xm], . . . , An[C1/X1, . . . ,Cm/Xm] then the term
t[C1/X1, . . . ,Cm/Xm][q1/x1, . . . , qn/xn] is reducible.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the complexity of the term t. For t of the
form xA, ps or λy.p the argument is an easy adaptation of the one presented in
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[6], Subsection 6.3.3 (using Definition 4 and Lemma 2 above). The new cases are
universal application and type abstraction.
Let t :≡ (p∀Y.BD)B[D/Y], with D an atomic type. Take Z a type variable such
that FV(D) ⊆ {Z}, i.e. we are assuming that if D is a type variable then it
is the variable Z. We want to show that the term (pD)[C̄/X̄, P/Z][q̄/x̄] is re-
ducible with C̄ and P atomic types and q̄ a sequence of reducible terms of ap-
propriate types. By induction hypothesis we know that p[C̄/X̄, P/Z][q̄/x̄] is re-
ducible of type ∀Y.B[C̄/X̄, P/Z]. By definition of reducibility, we infer that the
term (p[C̄/X̄, P/Z][q̄/x̄])D[P/Z] is reducible. But
(pD)[C̄/X̄, P/Z][q̄/x̄] ≡ (p[C̄/X̄, P/Z][q̄/x̄])D[P/Z],
as wanted.
For t :≡ ΛY.p, we want to prove that (ΛY.p)[C̄/X̄][q̄/x̄] is reducible. By defi-
nition of substitution, this term is ΛY.(p[C̄/X̄][q̄/x̄]). By Lemma 3, it is enough
to show that, for all atomic types D, (p[C̄/X̄][q̄/x̄])[D/Y] is reducible. Well, the
latter term is just p[C̄/X̄,D/Y][q̄/x̄], and this one is reducible by induction hy-
pothesis. ⊣
Theorem 1. All terms of Fat are reducible.
Proof. Let t[X1, . . . Xm][x1, . . . xn] be an arbitrary term, where all the free vari-
ables are among the ones presented. Since each xi, for i := 1, . . . , n, is neutral and
normal, we know by CR 4 it is reducible. X j for j := 1, . . . ,m are type variables,
so they are atomic types. By Proposition 1, we have that t[X1, . . . Xm][x1, . . . xn] is
reducible. ⊣
The following result is now immediate, using condition CR 1.
Corollary 1. The system Fat with βη-conversions is strongly normalizable.
§4. The reduction into the Fat calculus. It was shown in [3, 4] that the full
intuitionistic propositional calculus can be embedded into Fat as follows:
⊥:≡ ∀X.X
A ∧ B :≡ ∀X((A→ (B→ X))→ X)
A ∨ B :≡ ∀X((A→ X)→ ((B→ X)→ X)),
where X is a second-order variable which does not occur in A or B. This embed-
ding relies on the property of instantiation overflow: From formulas of the form
above, it is possible to deduce in Fat (respectively)
C
(A→ (B→ C))→ C
(A→ C)→ ((B→ C)→ C),
for any (not necessarily atomic) formula C. In other words, for formulas of the
form above (i.e., of the form ⊥, A ∧ B or A ∨ B), instantiation overflow ensures
that universal instantiation is no longer restricted to atomic formulas. (Notice that
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unrestricted universal instantiations are always automatic in the impredicative sys-
tem F.) The proof of instantiation overflow is by induction on the complexity of
C and provides an algorithmic method for obtaining the three kinds of deductions
above.
We are not merely going to use instantiation overflow but also the algorith-
mic manner in which it is obtained. In order to make the paper reasonably self-
contained, we present here the algorithm for disjunction. I.e., we show how to
deduce in Fat the formula (A → C) → ((B → C) → C), for arbitrary C, from
A ∨ B as defined above. For C atomic, there is nothing to argue. We just have
to analyze the cases in which C is D1 → D2 or ∀XD admitting (by induction
hypothesis) that instantiation overflow is available for D1 and D2, or D (respec-
tively). For C :≡ D1 → D2, we have:
∀X((A→ X)→ ((B→ X)→ X))
I.H.
(A→ D2)→ ((B→ D2)→ D2)
[A→ (D1 → D2)] [A]
D1 → D2 [D1]
D2
A→ D2
(B→ D2)→ D2 D
D2
D1 → D2
(B→ (D1 → D2))→ (D1 → D2)
(A→ (D1 → D2))→ ((B→ (D1 → D2))→ (D1 → D2))
whereD is the deduction
[B→ (D1 → D2)] [B]
D1 → D2 [D1]
D2
B→ D2
For C :≡ ∀XD we have:
∀X((A→ X)→ ((B→ X)→ X))
I.H.













(A→ ∀XD)→ ((B→ ∀XD)→ ∀XD)
We refer to the above procedure as the canonical way of disclosing the portion
of the proof hidden when using an instantiation overflow. In the proof trees below
(as above), the instantiation overflow, with the accompanying canonical hidden
portion, is signaled by a double horizontal line.
Having the property of instantiation overflow in place, full intuitionistic logic
embeds into Fat following Prawitz’s recipe of [12] to the latter. This embed-
ding provides a canonical way of translating proofs, rule-by-rule. The reader is
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referred to [3, 4] for an explicit account. Nevertheless, since the details of the
embedding are needed in the arguments below, we describe here the translations
of the natural deduction rules for disjunction. The introduction rule AA ∨ B is




(A→ X)→ ((B→ X)→ X)
∀X[(A→ X)→ ((B→ X)→ X)]




















∀X((A→ X)→ ((B→ X)→ X))















where the double line hides the instantiation overflow discussed before. For ease
of notation, in the translations above, we ignored the translations of A, B and C.
From now on, all the translations of proofs from the intuitionistic propositional
calculus into Fat are assumed to be obtained in this canonical way and are called
canonical translations.
The main purpose of this section is to give a proof of the strong normalization
for the full intuitionistic propositional calculus (with the standard β-conversions)
via the strong normalization for Fat. Let us start with a technical result:







(A→ X)→ ((B→ X)→ X)
∀X[(A→ X)→ ((B→ X)→ X)]


























Proof. The proof is by induction on the complexity of the formula C. If C is an
atomic formula only β-conversions are needed, more precisely four β-conversions.






















because, with C an atomic formula, the double line in the derivation is in fact the





















If C :≡ D1 → D2 and we disclose a bit of the portion hidden in the double line







(A→ X)→ ((B→ X)→ X)
∀X[(A→ X)→ ((B→ X)→ X)]
(A→ D2)→ ((B→ D2)→ D2)
[A→ (D1 → D2)] [A]
D1 → D2 [D1]
D2
A→ D2
(B→ D2)→ D2 D
D2
D1 → D2
(B→ (D1 → D2))→ (D1 → D2)
(A→ (D1 → D2))→ ((B→ (D1 → D2))→ (D1 → D2))
above the formula (A→ C)→ ((B→ C)→ C), whereD is the deduction
[B→ (D1 → D2)] [B]
D1 → D2 [D1]
D2
B→ D2
By induction hypothesis, the derivation reduces to




A [A→ (D1 → D2)]
D1 → D2 [D1]
D2
D1 → D2
(B→ (D1 → D2))→ (D1 → D2)






A→ (D1 → D2)






B→ (D1 → D2)
D1 → D2
by means of βη-conversions. Note that we have only changed the portion of
derivation above D2.










A→ (D1 → D2)
D1 → D2 [D1]
D2
D1 → D2




















If C :≡ ∀Y.D and we disclose a bit of the portion hidden in the double line (see







(A→ X)→ ((B→ X)→ X)
∀X[(A→ X)→ ((B→ X)→ X)]













(A→ ∀Y.D)→ ((B→ ∀Y.D)→ ∀Y.D)
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via βη-conversions. We only changed the portion of derivation above D. Applying














and with one more



















. This concludes the proof. ⊣
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Proof. The canonical translation of the redex of the standard conversion for
disjunction has exactly the form of the derivation in Lemma 4. The proof follows.
⊣
The standard conversion associated with conjunction can be studied in a sim-
ilar manner. Alternatively, we can rely on the observation that the connective of
conjunction (as opposed to disjunction) is a “good” connective (see the enjoyable
and interesting discussions in Chapter 10 of [6]). A straightforward reducibility
clause can be defined for conjunction and the strong βη-normalization proof of Fat
generalizes easily to a system extended with the primitive symbol of conjunction.
Theorem 2. The intuitionistic natural deduction calculus of ∧,∨,→,⊥ with the
standard (β) conversions is strongly normalizable.
Proof. From Proposition 2 and the above discussion, we know that each β-
reduction step of the full propositional calculus translates into at least one βη-
reduction step of the system Fat. Therefore, the result follows from the strong
normalization of Fat with respect to βη-conversions (see Corollary 1 above). ⊣
§5. Comments, questions, opinions. The study of predicative variants of sys-
tem F is by no means a novel subject. As far as we are aware, there are two basic
approaches to the subject. One is based on the restriction on the types (formulas)
allowed in the language of F. This is the approach of [2] and [1], where restric-
tions concerning parameters and nesting are in place in the language (the system
studied in the former reference is predicatively reducible, and the system of the
latter reference goes beyond predicativity, but subsumes the first system as a par-
ticular case). The other approach restricts the elimination rule of the universal
second-order quantifier. For instance, John Mitchell describes in [9] a predicative
polymorphic lambda calculus λ→,Π. In this calculus, impredicativism is elimi-
nated by means of a division of the types into two universes: The first universe is
constructed from base types and type variables using→, and the second universe
results from the first by closing it with respect to universal quantifications ranging
over variables of the first universe. Several predicative extensions of λ→,Π can be
found in the literature [10, 9, 8]. These strategies can ultimately be traced to ideas
of Bertrand Russell and Alfred North Whitehead when they introduced ramified
types in their magnum opus “Principia Mathematica” [14]. Our approach is the
second, but with a twist. It is observed that a property of reducibility (here in a
sense related to that of the axiom of reducibility of Russell and Whitehead, not to
be confounded with the notion of reducibility in normalization proofs) comes for
free in our setting via the phenomenon of instantiation overflow.
The measure of instantiation overflow that we discussed was restricted to uni-
versal second-order quantifications of the form
⊥:≡ ∀X.X
A ∧ B :≡ ∀X((A→ (B→ X))→ X)
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A ∨ B :≡ ∀X((A→ X)→ ((B→ X)→ X))
The above three types correspond to the empty type, the product type and the sum
type (respectively) in the terminology of Girard et al. [6]. We believe that it is
an interesting question to characterize exactly which types enjoy the property of
instantiation overflow.
By viewing the full intuitionistic calculus embedded in Fat, we were able to find
a rather natural proof of strong normalization for it. The proof is based on two al-
gorithms: One underlies the embedding of the full intuitionistic propositional cal-
culus into Fat (relying heavily on instantiation overflow), and the other is related
to the transformation of the β-conversions of the full intuitionistic propositional
calculus into βη-reductions of Fat. It would be nice to have a better understand-
ing of these algorithms, but we did not pursue this line of research in the present
paper. We also want to draw attention to the fact that our proof bestows a crucial
role to η-conversions. In Section 3.2 of [6], Girard says that η-conversions “have
never been given adequate status.” We cannot but help wondering if the role of
η-conversions in our strong normalization proof could not indicate a way of pro-
viding a reasonable status for η-conversions. The concrete proof that we presented
follows (as commented) Tait’s method of reducibility and, as such, is not formal-
izable in Peano arithmetic (let alone in primitive recursive arithmetic). This is
incidental, we think. It would be nice to investigate whether, for instance, the
proof technique used by Felix Joachimski and Ralph Matthes in [7] also applies
to our system Fat of atomic polymorphism.
We have been referring to [6] often. This is not only because we find this work
of Girard et al. very well-written and clear, but also because it raises interesting
issues and contains some rather stimulating comments. Girard defends that the
elimination rules for ⊥ and ∨ are not as natural and as well behaved as the other
inference rules. It is even added that the presence of these elimination rules poses
problems (e.g., the need for commuting conversions in order to have the subfor-
mula property in normal proofs) and gives rise to such “boring complications”
that “one tends to think that natural deduction should be modified to correct such
atrocities” (ibidem Section 10.5). System Fat (which embeds intuitionistic calcu-
lus and, in particular, ⊥ and ∨), on the other hand, has very well-behaved rules
and, moreover, possesses a sensible notion of subformula. It is not difficult to see,
by induction on the number of inferences in a normal proof (consult Subsection
10.3.1 of [6] for such kind of argument), that the following is true:
Let ∆ be a normal proof in Fat. Then:
(i) Every formula in ∆ is a subformula of the conclusion or of an undis-
charged hypothesis.
(ii) If ∆ ends in an elimination rule, then there is a (so-called) principal
branch (A0, . . . , An) such that
- A0 is an undischarged hypothesis
- An is the conclusion
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- Ai is a principal premise of an elimination rule with conclusion
Ai+1.
In particular, An is a subformula of A0.
From the above, one can prove standard results in structural proof theory (e.g.,
see [3] for the disjunction property). We have suggested in [4] that Fat provides
a natural and appealing framework for full intuitionistic propositional logic. As
Girard says in Section 10.5 of [6], “(...) the (⊥,∨,∃) fragment of the calculus is
(not) etched on tablets of stone.” The exact determination of the proof-theoretical
strength of Fat may be relevant for the appreciation of our proposal. This seems
to be an interesting problem.
In spite of the comments in the above paragraph, one can still pose the ques-
tion whether it is possible to produce, within our framework, an argument for the
strong normalization of the full propositional intuitionistic calculus with commut-
ing conversions (or with η-conversions). In [4], it was proved that (the translation
of) a redex and (the translation of) its contractum, with respect to a commuting
conversion, are β-equivalent in Fat. In other words, for commuting conversions,
one can go from the redex to the contractum by means of β-conversions in both
directions. The question at the beginning of this paragraph is, nevertheless, still
not answered.
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